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SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY v. PHILADELPHIA TRANSPORTATION
CO. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-DOES
THE RULE APPLY TO AN OPTION TO PURCHASE
HELD BY A MUNICIPALITY
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Southeastern Pennsylvania TransportationAuthority v. PhiladelphiaTransportationCo.'
has held that the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to an
option held by the city of Philadelphia for the purchase of the
transportation system owned and operated by PTC. The purpose
of this paper is to examine this decision to determine whether the
court had a sound basis for its holdings that: (1) interests held
by municipalities are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities;
(2) options to purchase property are not subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities and; (3) the Estates Act of 19472 applies to this conveyance.
PTC was formed in 1902 as the Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Company (PRT) when the various private transportation companies
serving the city of Philadelphia consolidated. In 1907 Philadelphia
and PRT entered into an agreement which granted PRT a franchise
to operate and gave the city an option to purchase the leaseholds
and franchises of PRT on July 1, 1957 or any July 1 thereafter.
Philadelphia did not have the power to condemn at the time of
this agreement. The 1907 agreement and the option to purchase
was amended in 1939 so that:
(1) The city could purchase the entire transportation system;
(2) The city could purchase PTC's assets free and clear
of indebtedness;'
(3) The city could exercise the option on any July 1
with six months' notice to PTC;
(4) The formula for determining the purchase price was
changed to:
1. 416 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967)

PTC].
2.

PA. STAT. ANN.

[hereinafter cited as SEPTA v.

tit. 20, §§ 301.1-21 (Supp. 1966).

3. There was a major controversy over this clause which will not be
discussed in this paper. SEPTA v. PTC, 416 Pa. 377, 390-397, 410-417, 233
A.2d 15, 20-24, 31-35 (1967).
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a. the amount of PTC's outstanding bonds, mortgages and ground rents;
b. the par value of PTC's outstanding preferred stock;
c. $10 per share of PTC's outstanding common stock;
d. the amount of PTC's then undistributed corporate
surplus;
(5) The city reserved the right of condemnation which it
had gained between 1907 and 1939;
(6) The city could assign its option to purchase.
Portions of the 1939 agreement were amended or extended by
later agreements in 1950, 1957, 1962 and 1965, but these agreements
did not alter the 1939 option to purchase. On June 8, 1965, the
city assigned its option to the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) which attempted to exercise the option. PTC claimed that the option was void under the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
The Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County disposed of
the question by holding that the Rule Against Perpetuities did
not apply because it is not applicable to a municipality; because it
does not apply to an option to purchase property; and because
the Estates Act of 19474 applied to the agreement.5 On appeal, the
supreme court affirmed.6 Whether or not SEPTA could purchase
PTC was not in issue, because both the city and SEPTA had the
power to condemn. The question at issue was the price SEPTA
would have to pay. If SEPTA used its power to condemn, it7
would be required to pay a reasonable price by current standards;
if it could use the option to purchase, it could obtain PTC for the
price derived by using the 1939 formula.
Though a majority of the supreme court stated that it was in
complete agreement with the reasoning of the lower court,8 it rephrased that reasoning. Rather than saying that the Rule Against
Perpetuities does not apply to a municipality, the supreme court
stated that "[t] he historical purpose of the [R] ule [A] gainst [P] erpetuities was to destroy serious hindrances to the beneficial and
prosperous use of property ....

In this case, the danger of fetter-

ing the free use of property is outweighed by considerations of
public concern and welfare."9 But the supreme court did not state
what those considerations of public' concern and welfare are. The
court went on to hold that all options to purchase property are
mere contract rights to which the Rule Against Perpetuities does
not apply. The court cited Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Trans4. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 301.1-21 Supp. 1966).
5. See unreported [hereinafter referred to as lower court decision]
decision of Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County in Record, vol. 1,
at 97a-245a, SEPTA v. PTC, 416 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967).
6. SEPTA v. PTC, 416 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-201 (Supp. 1966).
8. 416 Pa. 377, 382, 233 A.2d 15, 18 (1967).
9. Id. at 385, 233 A.2d at 19.
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portation Co. 10 as holding that the option gave Philadelphia no
interest in PTC's property until the option was exercised, and then
held that exclusively contractual agreements are not subject to the
Rule Against Perpetuities, citing Caplan v. Pittsburgh." The supreme court did not alter the lower court's reasoning concerning
the application of the Estates Act of 1947.12
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Bell stated that all three
reasons for not applying the Rule Against Perpetuities expressed
by the lower court were incorrect. 13 According to the Chief
Justice, 14 exempting municipalities from the Rule Against Perpetuities was against established policy and unsupported by authority.
Furthermore, an option to purchase land fettered the alienation of
that land and therefore any such options should be subject to the
Rule Against Perpetuities. 15 Finally, he felt that the Estates Act
of 1947 was not applicable because
no agreement after 1939
16
could alter the option to purchase.
The issue as to the applicability of the Estates Act of 1947 is
of little importance and can be dealt with briefly. The Act7
applies to all conveyances which took place after January 1, 1948.
A conveyance is an agreement which creates an interest in property.'
From this the lower court and majority of the supreme
court reasoned that the agreements between the city and PTC
after the 1939 agreement brought the option to purchase under the
Estates Act.'9 This reasoning appears flawed in that none of these
later agreements created any new interest in property, but rather
extended the option as it was created in 1939, an extension which
was unnecessary because the original option had no time limit. 20
In Huested Estate2 the court said that a pre-1948 trust which was
completely revised after 1948 qualified as a post-1948 conveyance
10. 386 Pa. 231, 126 A.2d 132 (1956).
11. 375 Pa. 268, 100 A.2d 380 (1953).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 301.1-21 (Supp. 1966).
13. 416 Pa. at 397-407, 233 A.2d at 24-29.
14. 426 Pa. at 405, 233 A.2d at 28.
15. 426 Pa. at 403, 233 A.2d at 27-28.
16. 426 Pa. at 404, 233 A.2d at 28.
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.21 (Supp. 1966); PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 20,
§ 301.4(b) (Supp. 1966). (b) Void interest-exceptions. Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law [R]ule [A]gainst [P]erpetuities as measured by actual rather than possible events any interest
not then vested and any interest in members of a class the membership of
which is then subject to increase shall be void.
18. Pa. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.1(2) (Supp. 1966).
§ 301.1 Definitions
(2) "Conveyance" means an act by which it is intended to create
an interest in real or personal property whether the act is intended
to have inter vivos or testamentary operation.
19. 426 Pa. at 385-386, 233 A.2d at 20.
20. See agreements between PTC and Philadelphia in Record, vol.
1, at 30a-71a; SEPTA v. PTC, 426 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967).
21. 403 Pa. 185, 169 A.2d 57 (1961).
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when the revision affected both the corpus and distribution.2 2 This
would not seem to be precedent for holding that a 1939 option to
purchase property which has remained unchanged should qualify as
a post-1948 conveyance. The fact that the price to be paid by
SEPTA for PTC in 1964 was based on the 1939 formula 23 indicates
that later agreements did not change the nature of the 1939 option
and no new interest had been created which would place the option under the Estates Act of 1947. Thus the Estates Act should not
be considered a bar to the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The more important issues are whether the supreme court intended to affirm the lower court holding that a municipality is not
subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, and whether an option
to purchase property is an agreement not subject to the Rule. Even
though the supreme court did not choose to restate the lower court's
reasoning on these two points, it said:
The lower court's opinion, we believe, sets forth a comprehensive well-reasoned analysis of the problems involved
and proposes, in every instance, a solution which this court
deems fair and proper. Accordingly, we recommend to the
interested reader that he closely study that opinion, for we
24
intend here only to highlight the matters of importance.
This statement indicates that the supreme court intended to support the lower court on these two points. This would put SEPTA
v. PTC partially in conflict with Barton v. Thaw,2 5 which both the
26
supreme court and lower court relied upon in their decisions.
Barton involved an option which read: "[S]hould the parties
of the second part at any future time whatsoever desire to purchase any of said land in fee simple, then said parties of the first
In the words of the court:
Each time the settlor executed an amendment or supplement
after 1947 to his 1940 trust indenture, (a) the scheme of distribution as to the named beneficiaries was changed and (b) the amount
or interest given to each beneficiary was substantially changed
and (c) the settlor completely restated the entire dispositive provisions, so that each amendment or supplement constituted a new
and complete disposition or the trust assets. Moreover, while the
settlor did not state in each or any supplement that the dispositive
provisions of the original trust deed were revoked, that was clearly
his intent, and the necessary, actual and legal effect of each succeeding supplement was to revoke the dispositive provisions of the
prior supplement and create at that time new dispositive interests
or gifts.
We therefore hold that the amendments of 1951 and 1956 were
clearly "conveyances of assets" within both the language and spirit
22.

of the Estates Act of 1947 ....

403 Pa. at 192, 169 A.2d at 61.
23. SEPTA v. PTC, 426 Pa. 377, 387-395, 233 A.2d 15, 20-24 (1967).
24. 426 Pa. at 382, 233 A.2d at 18.
25. 246 Pa. 268, 92 A. 312 (1914).
See
26. SEPTA v. PTC, 426 Pa. 377, 385, 233 A.2d 15, 19 (1967).
unreported lower court decision in Record, vol. 1, at 97a, 168a, SEPTA v.
PTC, 426 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967).
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. covenant and agree to sell . ..

at a price not exceeding

$100 per acre. ' 27 There was no limit on the option as to time; all
or any part of the land subject to the option could be purchased,
and the price was predetermined. Though the option was recognized as a contract right, the supreme court felt that it was a
very definite restriction on alienation and that the Rule Against
Perpetuities should be applied. 28 PTC cited Barton to support
its argument that the Rule Against Perpetuities should have been
applied to the option. But the supreme court said that Barton
did not apply for policy reasons without explaining what reasons
they had in mind. 29 The lower court stated that "Barton v. Thaw
is unquestionably good law. ' 30 Yet both the lower court and the
majority of the supreme court found that the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to options to purchase property despite the
fact that Barton is still controlling law in Pennsylvania. 31 The
lower court relied heavily on the dissenting opinion in Philadelphia
v. PhiladelphiaTransportationCo.32 In that dissent, Chief Justice
Bell had stated, "[p]rior to any exercise of the option by the City,
the optionee has no interest, legal or equitable, in or to the property subject to the option. . .. 13 It is, I believe, clear that the

City's unexercised option of purchase gives the city no interest in
the Company's properties. . .. -34 Philadelphia v. Philadelphia
Transportation Co. did not deal with the validity of the agreement
under the Rule Against Perpetuities, but whether PTC could pay
its stockholders a dividend over the city's objection. A majority of
that court held that the city's interest in PTC through the option
was sufficient to prevent the payment of the dividend.3 5 Clearly,
27.
28.

246 Pa. at 364, 92 A. at 316.
The court stated:
By its terms the option may be accepted at any time "before
the sun grows cold, and the stars are old, and the leaves of the
judgment book unfold." The time is limited only by the confines
of eternity. We cannot conceive of a more violent breach of the
[R]ule [A]gainst [P]erpetuities. Such an impress on land ought
not to be sustained, and it cannot be. It isolates property. It takes
it out of commerce. It remove[s] it from the market. It halts
improvements.
246 Pa. at 363-64, 92 A. at 316. See Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co., 192
F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1951); Middleton v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 241
F. Supp. 418 (W.D. Ark. 1965); Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 A. 392
(1922); Mumma v. Hinkle, 20 D. & C.2d 621 (1958).
29. 426 Pa. at 385, 233 A.2d at 19.
30. See unreported lower court decision in Record, vol. 1, 97a, 168a,
SEPTA v. PTC, 426 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967).
31. Id.
32. 386 Pa. 231, 126 A.2d 132 (1956).
33. 386 Pa. at 245, 126 A.2d at 138.
34. 386 Pa. at 247, 126 A.2d at 139.
35. The court said:
[M]ost important of all on this question [whether or not
Philadelphia can keep PTC from paying a dividend to its stockholders] is the provision of the agreement between the City and
the Company which gives the City the right to purchase all the
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the basis for not applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to the
option in SEPTA v. PTC was that an option to purchase property
is not an interest in property until exercised, which makes the unexercised option a contract right to which the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply. However, there are two lines of authority
on this question.
The majority rule is that an option to purchase land is merely
a contract right until exercised; however, when it is exercised the
option becomes a vested interest in the land. Thus, an unexercised option to purchase is considered an interest in land contingent upon its exercise and is controlled by the Rule Against Perpetuities.3 6 In Middleton v. Western Coal and Mining Co. 37 it was
held that a mining company's option to purchase land at any time
within sixty years for an agreed upon price was void under the
Rule Against Perpetuities.
An interest in the surface in fee in the nature of an
option or an election which grants a contingent interest,
the exercise of which depends upon the discretion of the
grantee and its successors or assigns and without any limitation as to time, unduly encumbers the alienation of
the estate.38
In Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co. 3 9 the court decided that an option to purchase land if a building was not constructed on it
was void because of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
[T] he option, if exercised, will give the grantee of the
option a right to regain title to the land at a fixed price
..

.

. This is an interest in land with the contingency that

the option be exercised and, since no time limit is placed
upon the contingency, the [R] ule 40[A]gainst [P] erpetuities
applies and makes the option void.
Both Middleton and Morgan emphasized the fact that the unexercised option is merely a contract right, but since the exercised
option would create a vested interest, both courts felt that the Rule
Thus it will be seen that an illegal disCompany's property ....
posal of any part of the Company's property, which includes, of
course, its cash assets, would correspondingly diminish the value of
the property at the time when the option might be exercised....
The Company contends that the City, as optionee, has no legal or
equitable interest in the company's property as such, but it certainly does have an interest in its right under the agreement to
exercise its option according to the terms and at the price therein
provided and without any intervening impairment, if illegal, of the
value of the property which is the subject of the option.
386 Pa. at 238-239, 126 A.2d at 135.
36. Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N.E. 352 (1892); Lilley's Estate,
272 Pa. 143, 116 A. 392 (1922); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 A. 312 (1914);
Mumma v. Hinkle, 20 D. & C.2d 621 (1958); Starcher v. Duty, 61 W. Va.
373, 56 S.E. 524 (1965).
37. 241 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Ark. 1965).
38. 241 F. Supp. at 417-418.
39. 192 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1951).
40. 192 F.2d at 600.
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should be applied to protect the alienability
Against Perpetuities
41
of the land.
A minority of cases have agreed that an option to purchase
land is a contract right, but have refused to consider this right a
contingent interest in land. 4 2 Perhaps the best statement of this
view appears in Todd v. Citizens Gas Co.4 3 where the court said:

But the rule [the Rule Against Perpetuities] may not
be invoked even on appellant's theory that the rights of the
city amounted to nothing more than an option to be exercised at any time within twenty-five years. The [R]ule
[A] gainst [P] erpetuities concerns rights of property. By
the great weight of authority, a mere option to purchase
of an option with any inland does not vest the 4holder
4
terest, legal or equitable.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania supported the majority
view in Barton v. Thaw and the minority view in Caplan v. Pittsburgh45 and both views are presently part of Pennsylvania case
law. Caplan, which did not deal with an option to purchase, held
that a contract right, which if enforced would create a vested
interest in land, was not controlled by the Rule Against Perpetuities. 46 A property owner had contracted away his right to sue
for damages if the city decided to widen the street and condemn
part of his property at any time in the future. This was definitely
a contract right which would restrict the alienability of the land,
but the court stated that the Rule Against Perpetuities did not
apply. 47 Caplan has yet to be cited for its holding on this issue in
any case other than SEPTA v. PTC. SEPTA v. PTC then is directly in line with Caplan and the minority rule in holding that the
Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to an option to purchase
property and yet it appears that the court did not intend to reverse Barton.
41. Supra notes 38 and 40.
42. Todd v. Citizens Gas Co., 46 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1931). See Richardson v. Hardwick, 106 U.S. 252 (1868); Keog v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N.E.
266 (1925); Thacher v. Weston, 197 Mass. 143, 83 N.E. 360 (1908). See also
Caplan v. Pittsburgh, 375 Pal 268, 100 A.2d 380 (1953).
43. 46 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1931).
44. 46 F.2d at 866. Though the Todd court states that its view is
supported by "the great weight of authority," this view is not supported
by case law. See note 36 supra.
45. 375 Pa. 268, 100 A.2d 380 (1953).
46. The court said:
The contract-for that is what the covenant is-provides that
when the city widened the street through eminent domain proceedings and took the designated portion of the land, the grantee promised not to sue for damages and therefore waived same. This constituted an effective release. Such a proceeding created no interest
in future, but presently released all future damages. The grantee
made this covenant not only for himself but for "his successors"
as well.
375 Pa. at 274, 100 A.2d at 384 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
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A possible reason for the apparent conflict may rest in distinguishing features of the cases. Both Caplan and SEPTA involve a
municipality as a party while in Barton both parties were private
individuals. This leads to the apparently unsettled question of
whether or not the Rule Against Perpetuities can be applied to a
municipality. No Pennsylvania case other than SEPTA v. PTC
has dealt with this issue. The only case which holds directly on
this question in a foreign jurisdiction is Schonthal v. Village of Sylvania48 which stated flatly that, "[c]ertainly no [R]ule [A]gainst
[P]erpetuities could ever be intended to apply to municipal corporations. On the contrary, they are designed and intended to
be perpetual. '49 The Schonthal court, however, gives no further
explanation for this statement.
This issue is also discussed briefly in a California case. Haggerty v. Oakland50 did not hold on the question of whether or
not the Rule Against Perpetuities applied to a municipality but
simply applied the Rule against the city. Oakland held a lease on
property owned by a private individual which was to run for ten
years after the completion of construction of the building which
was to be subject to the lease. The court held that since there was
a possibility the lease would run longer than twenty-one years
from the date of its creation, it was void. 51 Obviously this court
was not following a doctrine which exempted municipalities from
the Rule Against Perpetuities. SEPTA v. PTC is supported by an
article written by an eminent property law expert, W. Barton
Leach, who criticized the Haggerty case:
The Rule Against Perpetuities is a device for protecting the public interest against private settlements which
unduly tie up the basic resources of the community. But
in this case the city is the public. It is at least arguable
that the Rule should not apply at all to dispositions made
by duly constituted public bodies. The judge-made Rule
was never conceived as a limitation upon the sovereign,
and the California constitution, incorporating the commonlaw Rule, should not be construed as a52 limitation on
action by the state or any of its subdivisions.
48. 60 Ohio App. 407, 21 N.E.2d 1008 (1938).
49. Id. at 415, 21 N.E.2d at 1012.
50. 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958).
51. The court said:
The courts are not permitted to relax the [R]ule [A]gainst
[P]erpetuities. The people have spoken by adopting the constitutional provision, and the Legislature has reaffirmed that position as
late as 1951. The [R]ule itself contains no exceptions, and the
courts should not create them .... Once an exception is created
to the application of the [R]ule . . .no one can foretell where it
may lead, or how it may be abused.
Id. at 417, 326 P.2d at 966.
52. Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory Correctives, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1321 (1960).
Haggerty was also disapproved in Wang v. Di Grazia, 60 Cal. App. 2d
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The only authority offered by Leach for this statement is his own
eminence in the field of property law. His rationale is similar to
the rationale of the SEPTA v. PTC. There the court said that since
a municipality represents the people, the Rule Against Perpetuities, devised to protect the public from the fettering of alienation
of property, would not be serving its purpose if used to destroy
unlimited contingent interests held by a municipality.5 3
Another aspect of the reasoning used in SEPTA v. PTC is illustrated where the lower court says "to extend it [the rationale of
Barton v. Thaw] to the present case would permit PTC to repudiate its most solemn agreements, from which it has greatly
benefited, and would do the public, as represented by the City, a
great injustice. In Professor Leach's acid phrase, such a result
would be an absurdity. 6' 4 This indicates that the court feels the
right of freedom of contract is more important than the policies
underlying the Rule Against Perpetuities. This does not support
the theory that municipalities are exempt from the Rule, since the
importance of freedom of contract is as valid a policy where pri525, 386 P.2d 817 (1963). As in Haggerty there was a ten year lease to
begin upon the completion of construction. Neither party in Wong represented a municipality and no direct mention of whether or not the Rule
Against Perpetuities could be used against a municipality was made. Wong
attacked Haggerty on the grounds that since the lease was only for ten
years, eleven years were left for completion of construction and there was
little danger of the Rule being violated. Wong held that the lease should
not be voided by the Rule when there was only a remote possibility that the
twenty-one year period would be violated.
The court said:
Although the courts, at times, have been relentless in their
application of the [R]ule [A]gainst [P]erpetuities, they have
seldom carried relentlessness to such extremes. Both the California
cases and those of a majority of other states, hold that a document
should be interpreted if feasible to avoid the conclusion that it
violates the [R] ule [A] gainst [P] erpetuities.
60 Cal. App. 2d at 535, 386 P.2d at 827. The court stated that the Rule should
not be applied strictly, but that it should be applied in such a way as to
facilitate modern commercial transactions. In the words of the court:
Certainly our function is not to interpret the [R]ule so as to
create commercial anomalies. A lease to commence upon completion of the leased building is a common business arrangement....
[TIhe parties to such transactions do not suspect that the [R]ule
will be extended to invalidate their agreements ....

Surely the

courts do not seek to invalidate bona fide transactions by the imported application of esoteric legalisms. Our task is not to block
the business pathway but to clear it, defining it by guideposts that
are reasonably to be expected ....

We therefore do not propose

to apply the [R]ule in the rigid or remorseless manner characterized by some past decisions; instead we shall seek to interpret it
reasonably, in the light of its objectives and the economic conditions of modern society.
Id. at 531, 386 P.2d at 823.
53. See unreported lower court decision in Record, vol. 1, at 97a, 164a,
SEPTA v. PTC, 426 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967).
54. See lower court decision in Record at 97a, 168a, SEPTA v. PTC,
426 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967).
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vate parties are involved as where a governmental unit is concerned.
This view, however, does illustrate another distinction between
SEPTA v. PTC and Barton v. Thaw. Barton was concerned with
one piece of property and one contract and might be said to have
been an agreement mainly concerned with property rights. SEPTA
v. PTC involved a complicated series of contracts in which the
main concern was the operation and control of the transportation
system of the city of Philadelphia, in effect a primarily contractual agreement. This rationale, however, does not explain away
Caplan v. Pittsburgh where there was only one contract and one
piece of land involved.
Another argument for exempting municipalities from the Rule
Against Perpetuities can be found in Merritt-Chapman & Scott
Corp. v. Public Utility Dist. No. 255 and Todd v. Citizens Gas Co.56
In Merritt a bond issue had been sold to establish a fund to finance
the construction of a dam. The court found that the money in the
fund was held in trust for the government for the completion of
the dam. Plaintiff claimed that these trusts failed because they
violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. The court stated: "This
rule [the Rule Against Perpetuities] does not apply to these trusts,
because they are classified within the category of trusts for a Governmental or Municipal Purpose." 57 The court relied upon Austin
Scott's treatise58 which states that a trust held for the government
or municipality is a charitable trust 9 to which the Rule Against
Perpetuities did not apply. 60
Todd is directly in line with Merritt holding that a trust established for a municipality is a charitable trust. 61

In Todd the city

had appointed a board of trustees to establish a utility corporation. The stockholders of the corporation were to receive a fixed
return for their investments; if at the end of twenty-five years
the stockholders had not received this return the city had an option to acquire the corporation's assets by paying the balance due
to the stockholders. The court refused to apply the Rule Against
Perpetuities to the city's option, holding that this was a charitable trust to which the Rule did not apply.0 2 Although no trust is
involved, the facts in SEPTA v. PTC are similar to Todd. Phil55. 237 F. Supp. 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
56. 46 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1931).
57. 237 F. Supp. at 994.
58. A. SCOTT, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 373 (1960).
59. IV A. ScoTT, Ti LAW OF TRUSTS § 373 (2d ed. 1956); Government
or Municipal Purpose
A trust for the erection or construction of public works is
It has been held that a trust for the purpose of
charitable ....
supplying the community with these or other facilities, which are
usually supplied at the expense of the taxpayers, is charitable. ...
60. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 589-628 (4th ed. 1942).
61. 46 F.2d at 866.
62. Id.
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adelphia had a very substantial interest in PTC.6 3 By the 1939
agreement between the city and PTC, the Mayor of Philadelphia,
ex officio, and four members appointed by the City Council were
to sit on PTC's Board of Directors as full voting members; 64 City
Council reserved the power to approve or disapprove any addition or extension of property or equipment PTC wished to make; 5
the city had the power to limit PTC's indebtedness, stock issue,
and dividend payment, 66 as well as the power to approve any
transfer.6 7 Though PTC was not controlled by a board of trustees
and though PTC received no money for operation from a specific
fund established by the city, PTC was substantially controlled by
the city. The SEPTA court could have utilized the same rationale
as was used in Todd and Merritt, but instead they merely stated
the effect of such a rationale; a municipality is exempt from the
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
A closer look indicates that exempting municipalities from the
Rule might do more damage than good to the public interest. The
rationale behind the Rule Against Perpetuities, is stated in Barton
v. Thaw:
Such an impress on land [as an unlimited contingent
interest] ought not to be sustained, and it cannot be. It
isolates the property. It takes it out of commerce. It remove[s] it from the market. It halts improvements. It
prevents the land from answering to the needs of growing communities. .

.

. The entire community is interested.

The welfare of the public is at stake. It is contrary to the
well settled public policy of the state that such an option
or right to purchase land should be held to be good. It
was for the express purpose of destroying such serious hinderances to material and against social property and proggress that the [R] ule [A] gainst [P] erpetuities was brought
forth.68
Thus, an agreement that isolates property, keeps it out of commerce
or hinders its development violates the policy of the Rule as
stated in Barton; and yet the exemption of municipalities from the
Rule does just that in SEPTA. Under the 1939 agreement, the
city's power to control the disposition of PTC's property 9 is a limitation which isolates that property from the stream of commerce.
The option to purchase is an impress upon the property,70 which
hinders any development of it.
63. Supra note 35.
64. See agreements between Philadelphia and PTC in Records at 16a,
21a. SEPTA v. PTC, 426 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967).
65. Id. at 19a.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 246 Pa. 348, 364, 92 A. 312, 316 (1914).
69. See agreements between Philadelphia and PTC in Record at 16a,
19a-21a. SEPTA v. PTC, 426 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967).
70. Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 386 Pa. 231, 126
A.2d 132 (1956).
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But more dangerous to the public interest than either of these
factors is that portion of the agreement which establishes the consideration to be paid if the option is exercised. Part of the formula
for determining the consideration is based on a valuation of the
common stock: 71 to hold a company to such an agreement for a
long time is almost to insure that eventually, the price to be paid
will be irrelevant to the actual value of the property. When this
point is reached it is possible that a company, operating under the
threat of being forced at any time to sell its capital assets at less
than book value, will strain to keep the value of these assets at a

minimum. The net effect, especially in the case of a utility, is that
the public is forced to rely on an organization which makes no
capital improvements, and which consequently provides poor service. The legislature's opinion on this matter is represented by its
insistence that local governments pay a reasonable market value
when exercising the power of eminent domain.
CONCLUSION

The rationale of SEPTA v. PTC that the Estates Act of 1947
applies to the option to purchase in the 1939 agreement is faulty
because there was no conveyance between the city and PTC following the effective date of the Estates Act.
Though the lower court stated that the Rule Against Perpetuities did not apply to an option to purchase property, other language indicates that the holding of SEPTA applied only to the
particular option between the city and PTC. SEPTA was not
intended to overrule Barton v. Thaw. SEPTA held the Rule
Against Perpetuities should not be applied to this particular option because one of the parties to the agreement was a municipality which represented the public. Cases exempting municipalities from the Rule have been based on the rationale that the
Rule was designed to protect the public from the fettering of alienation of property, and since a municipality represents the interests of the public, no harm will be done if municipalities are exempted from the Rule. The effect of such reasoning could, however, be quite damaging to the public interest by hindering the
improvement of the property of any company involved in such
an agreement with a municipality. A study of the reasoning in
SEPTA indicates that the court's rationale does not support the
court's holding. The strongest argument for the support of the
SEPTA holding is that the court looked at this particular situation,
balanced the contractual interests against the property interests in
the agreement between PTC and the city, and determined that
the right of freedom of contract outweighed the argument for application of the Rule Against Perpetuities in this case.
SAMUEL A.

SCOTT

71. See agreements between Philadelphia and PTC in Record at 16a,
26a. SEPTA v. PTC, 426 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 156 (1967).

